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Abstract
The assumption of asymmetric and incomplete information in a standard New 
Keynesian model creates strong incentives for monetary policy transparency. We 
assume that the central bank has better information about its objectives than the 
private sector, and that the private sector has better information about shocks than the 
central bank. Transparency has the potential to trigger a virtuous circle in which all 
agents find it easier to make inferences and the economy is better stabilised. Our 
analysis improves upon existing work by endogenising the volatility of both output 
and inflation. Improved transparency most likely manifests itself in falling output 
volatility.
Keywords: Imperfect credibility, Asymmetric information, Signal extraction 
JEL Classification: E32, E37, E52 5
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1092
September 2009
Non-Technical Summary
There is a large consensus among policymakers and academics about the benets of credi-
bile and transparent monetary regimes in fostering overall macroeconomic stability. A general
argument is that such regimes, by anchoring in ation expectations around the objective of
the central bank, make price and wage setting less responsive to temporary shocks and al-
low the central bank to ensure greater macroeconomic stability through only moderate policy
actions. In contrast, poor transparency weakens the anchor on expectations and leads to a
deterioration in the stochastic properties of both in ation and output. For example, Erceg
and Levin (2003) show that a lack of transparency about the in ation target creates unwanted
in ation persistence and increased costs of de ation in an otherwise standard DSGE model.
This paper introduces an additional channel through which transparent monetary policy pro-
motes a more stable macroeconomic environment. The idea is that anchoring private in ation
expectations to a transparent target makes it is easier for the central bank to infer the state of
the economy, in which case the central bank is better informed and can ne-tune stabilisation
policy to increase stability in the macroeconomic environment. In particular, we consider a
situation in which the central bank is unable to observe either private in ation expectations
or the natural rate of interest that summarises the shocks hitting the economy. Private agents
in turn have to infer the in ation target of the central bank. Information in our model is
asymmetric because the central bank and private agents know dierent things. Information
is incomplete because neither the central bank nor private agents know everything about the
state of the economy. Such asymmetry and incompleteness of information means that the
central bank and private agents solve dierent yet interrelated inference problems, in which
case transparency has the potential to create a virtuous circle where all agents become better
informed. Transparency makes it easier for private agents to infer the in ation target, thereby
anchoring in ation expectations and making it easier for the central bank to infer the natural
rate of interest. But if the central bank has better knowledge of the natural rate of interest
then policy will be more predictable and private agents will nd it easier to infer the in ation
target. This exchange of information continues until all the gains from the complementarity of
the inference processes have been exploited. Our paper builds on the idea in Aoki and Kimura6
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(2008) that a central bank nds it di!cult to infer the state of the economy if private agents
are uncertain about the in ation target. Their paper stresses how, in an endowment economy
with  exible prices, asymmetric and incomplete information causes unwanted volatility and
persistence in in ation. An important limitation of their analysis is that output is exogenous
a n ds ob yc o n s t r u c t i o nu n a ected by any inferences made by the central bank and private
agents. We relax this assumption by considering a DSGE model where both in ation and
output are determined endogenously, and nd that asymmetric and incomplete information
has rst order implications for the stochastic properties of output. Moreover, the unwanted
volatility in output is considerably larger than that in in ation. That in ation and output
volatility exhibit time-variation has been convincingly argued by McConnell and Perez-Quiros
(2000), Cogley and Sargent (2005) and many others over the last decade. The mechanism we
identify in this paper contributes to this debate by showing how transparency of monetary
regimes promotes macroeconomic stability of both output and in ation.7
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1 Introduction
Many policymakers and academics believe that transparent monetary policy regimes have a
role to play in fostering macroeconomic stability. A general argument is that such regimes
anchor in ation expectations around the objective of the central bank, making prices and
wages less responsive to temporary shocks and allowing the central bank to ensure greater
macroeconomic stability through only moderate policy actions. In contrast, poor transparency
weakens the anchor on expectations and leads to a deterioration in the stochastic properties
of both in ation and output. For example, Erceg and Levin (2003) show that a lack of
transparency about the in ation target creates unwanted in ation persistence and increased
costs of de ation in an otherwise standard DSGE model.
This paper introduces an additional channel through which transparent monetary policy
promotes macroeconomic stability. The idea is that anchoring private in ation expectations to
a transparent target makes it is easier for the central bank to infer the state of the economy, in
which case the central bank is better informed and can ne-tune stabilisation policy to increase
stability in the macroeconomic environment. In particular, we examine a situation in which
the central bank is unable to observe either private in ation expectations or the natural rate
of interest that summarises the shocks hitting the economy. The more well-anchored private
in ation expectations are in such a world the easier it is for the central bank to infer and react
to the natural rate of interest. Private agents in turn know the natural rate of interest but
have to infer the in ation target of the central bank. Information in our model is asymmetric
because the central bank and private agents know dierent things. Information is incomplete
because neither the central bank nor private agents know everything about the state of the
economy.
There are strong incentives for transparency in our model. The asymmetry and incom-
pleteness of information means that the central bank and private agents solve dierent yet
interrelated inference problems, in which case transparency has the potential to create a virtu-
ous circle where all agents become better informed. Transparency makes it easier for private
agents to infer the in ation target, thereby anchoring in ation expectations and making it
easier for the central bank to infer the natural rate of interest. But if the central bank has8
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better knowledge of the natural rate of interest then policy will be more predictable and private
agents will nd it easier to infer the in ation target. This exchange of information continues
until all the gains from the complementarity of the inference processes have been exploited. A
lack of transparency in monetary policy similarly triggers a vicious circle in which the di!culty
faced by private agents when trying to infer the in ation target makes it harder for the central
bank to infer the natural rate of interest and so on.
Our paper builds on the idea in Aoki and Kimura (2008) that a central bank nds it di!cult
to infer the state of the economy if private agents are uncertain about the in ation target.
Their paper stresses how, in an endowment economy with  exible prices, asymmetric and
incomplete information causes unwanted volatility and persistence in in ation. An important
limitation of their analysis is that output is exogenous and so by construction unaected
by any inferences made by the central bank and private agents. We relax this assumption by
considering a DSGE model where both in ation and output are determined endogenously, and
nd that asymmetric and incomplete information has rst order implications for the stochastic
properties of output. Moreover, the unwanted volatility in output is considerably larger than
that in in ation. The DSGE model we use draws on earlier work by Erceg and Levin (2003)
that shows how in ation becomes persistent if private agents have to learn the in ation target
in a DGE model with staggered nominal contracts. Our contribution uses a similar framework,
but imposes the additional complication that in ation expectations are unobservable so the
central bank only infers the natural rate of interest and does not know it with certainty.
The structure of asymmetric and incomplete information we assume implies that the cen-
tral bank does not have ready access to measures of the in ation expectations of private
agents. We nd our assumption realistic. Whilst central banks can and do use survey data
and information contained in asset prices to quantify the in ation expectations of market
participants, such indicators will at best be noisy and at worst may be uncorrelated with the
in ation expectations of private agents that actually drive the economy. For example, Bekaert
et al. (2006) and Kosicki and Tinsley (2005) disagree in empirical studies as to whether US
in ation expectations were 14% or 8% in the late 1970s to early 1980s. Such large discrepan-
cies give credence to our assumption that central banks only have limited information about9
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the in ation expectations of private agents.
An alternative view of our contribution is that it improves our understanding of how
forward-looking agents make optimal inferences when faced with only limited information
about the state of the economy. The seminal papers in this literature by Pearlman (1986,
1992) and Pearlman et al. (1986) derive optimal monetary policy under incomplete (partial
in this literature) yet symmetric information. More recent contributions by Aoki (2003) and
Svensson and Woodford (2004) solve for optimal policy under asymmetric information, but
assume that private agents have complete information so information is only incomplete on
the part of the central bank. Whilst we do not address the question of optimal policy in this
paper, our analysis allows for information sets that are both incomplete and asymmetric.
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we outline our DSGE model of the economy
and specify what information is held by the central bank and private agents. Section 3
describes the interrelated inference problems of the central bank and private agents, and
solves for equilibrium dynamics using a variant of the method of undetermined coe!cients. A
quantitative assessment of the model is provided in Section 4. A nal Section concludes.
2 The economic environment
A full characterisation of the economic environment requires us to specify what information
dierent agents hold, how agents make inferences on the basis of that information, and how
inferences aect aggregate outcomes in the economy. In this Section we start the process from
the last of these, by rst describing the DSGE model that maps inferences to outcomes. We
then dene information sets and add the assumption that agents have rational expectations
subject to their information and knowledge of the economy.
2.1 The model economy
The link between inferences and outcomes in our economy is described by the standard New
Keynesian model originally introduced by Calvo (1983) and extensively reviewed by Wood-10
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ford (2003).1 The model consists of an intertemporal IS equation (2.1) and an expectations-
augmented aggregate supply equation (2.2), which themselves are log-linear approximations









ww+1),( 2 . 1 )
w = |w + H
s
ww+1.( 2 . 2 )
The equations simultaneously determine the output gap |w and in ation rate w as functions of
expectations and the short-term nominal interest rate l
s
w as perceived by private agents.2 The
expectations in (2.1) and (2.2) are superscripted s to indicate that households and rms form
expectations conditional on the information set of private agents. We assume that households
and r m sh a v et h es a m ep r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o ns e tL
s
w .T h e t e r m uq
w is the Wicksellian natural
rate of interest, namely the equilibrium real rate of interest that would prevail if the economy





w31 + xw,( 2 . 3 )
where xw is llg normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2
x. The short-term nominal
interest rate l
s
w is assumed to be that set by the central bank lf
w plus an llg normally-distributed
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w),( 2 . 5 )
with W
w a time-varying in ation target, Hf
wuq
w the central bank’s current estimate of the natural
rate of interest and Hf
ww the central bank’s estimate of current in ation. The central bank’s
1See also Goodfriend and King (1997) and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999).
2Preston (2004) argues that equations such as (2.1) and (2.2) are not properly microfounded when agents
do not have complete information. We acknowledge this point but follow the traditional approach of Honkapo-
hja, Mitra and Evans (2003) and impose our information structure on aggregate relationships derived under
complete information.11
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y|) prevent it from knowing either current in ation or the output gap with certainty.
This idea follows Orphanides (2002) and is motivated by practical constraints that real-time
policy often has to act before actual outcomes are known. The expectations in (2.5) are
superscripted f to indicate that policy is set by the central bank subject to its own information
set Lf
w. We assume !A1 so the short-term nominal interest rate responds strongly to expected
in ation and the Taylor principle is satised. With determinacy of equilibrium thus ensured, it
can be shown as in Woodford (2001) that our simple policy rule is consistent with the optimal
equilibrium. The time-varying in ation target W





w31 + %ws,( 2 . 6 )
where %ws is llg normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2
%s.T h et e r mW
w is expressed
in terms of the percentage deviation from the constant steady-state in ation target around
which the model is log-linearised, and is assumed to be su!ciently persistent that the economy
takes a long time to return to steady state after an %ws shock. The structure and parameters
in equations (2.1) - (2.6) are assumed to be common knowledge, as are the distributions of all
shocks.
2.2 Information structure
The information set of private agents includes in ation, the output gap, their perception of
the short-term nominal interest rate, the natural rate of interest, the central bank’s current
estimate of in ation and the central bank’s current estimate of the natural rate of interest,
i.e. L
s






w }. The presence of in ation, the output gap and the private
perception of the short-term nominal interest rate follows immediately from the role of private
agents as households and rms. That private agents know the natural rate of interest can be
motivated by the island model of Aoki and Kimura (2008), where information is aggregated in
equilibrium such that private agents are better informed about the natural rate of interest than
the central bank.3 Private agents are assumed to use publicly available documents to obtain
3Our assumption that private agents have complete information about the natural rate of interest can be
interpreted as a special case of Aoki and Kimura (2008). Moreover, relaxing the assumption of complete12
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the central bank’s current estimates of in ation and the natural rate of interest. It is not
unusual for central banks to publish such information. Indeed, the Bank of England publishes
its assessment of current and future in ation and output growth in the quarterly In ation
Report, alongside measures of capacity utilisation that can be interpreted as estimates of the
output gap. The Monthly Bulletin of the European Central Bank similarly makes public a
wide range of macroeconomic data including projections of in ation within the current quarter.
Finally, the Congressional Budget O!ce compiles data on current and future real potential
gross domestic product that is subsequently published by the Federal Reserve Board. Data
on potential real gross domestic product can be thought of as a proxy for the central bank’s
estimate of the natural rate of output in the economy.
The information set of the central bank is comprised of the in ation target, the short-term
nominal interest rate it sets and noisy indicators of in ation and the output gap contaminated
by measurement errors, i.e. Lf
w  {e 
W
w>l f
w>w + yw>| w + yw|}. Whilst it is obvious that the
in ation target and the short-term nominal rate of interest should be included, the absence
of the natural rate of interest from the information set of the central bank warrants further
comment. In theory, if a central bank could perfectly observe the expectations of private
agents then it would be much easier for it to calculate the natural rate of interest. In practice,
expectations are never perfectly observed and the central bank has to rely on surveys or
attempt to extract expectations from asset market data. Neither method is wholly satisfactory
and it is likely to be di!cult to nd robust estimates of private sector expectations. Even
with the benet of hindsight and ex post data, empirical studies such as Bekaert et al. (2006)
and Kosicki and Tinsley (2005) still disagree wildly about the level of in ation expectations
some 25 years ago. We argue that tracking current expectations is even more problematic so
it is reasonable to assume that the central bank has no way of observing the expectations of
p r i v a t ea g e n t s ,i nw h i c hc a s ei tc a n n o tu s et h e mt oi n f e rt h en a t u r a lr a t eo fi n t e r e s t . T h e
central bank can of course use the other variables in its information set to make inferences
about the expectations of private agents and the natural rate of interest.
Our information structure diers in several respects from that typically found in the ex-
information does not as such undermine the message of our paper.13
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isting literature. In contrast to the early literature of Pearlman (1986, 1992) and Pearlman
et al. (1992), we do not assume that information is symmetric between private agents and
the central bank. Of the studies that do allow for asymmetric information, we depart from
Aoki (2003) and Svensson and Woodford (2004) by allowing private agents to have incomplete
rather than complete information. The closest information structure to ours is found in Aoki
and Kimura (2008), although their assumption that the central bank observes in ation and
the output gap makes inference trivial if output is endogenous. Our assumption that the
central bank only has access to noisy indicators of in ation and the output gap ensures that
inference still plays a role even though output is determined endogenously in our model.
2.3 The inference problem of private agents
The assumption that central bank inferences are available to private agents is useful because it
restricts the degree of higher order beliefs that matter in equilibrium. In Section 3 we nd that
























The problem of private agents is to infer the unknown elements of [w. In our model private
agents do not know W
w and %wt, but do know Hf
wuq
w and Hf
ww through knowing central bank















and noting that the sum on the right hand side is observable, the inference problem of private
agents is a question of whether movements in their perceived short-term nominal interest rate
l
s
w are most likely due to perception errors %wt or persistent shocks to the in ation target %ws.
This is a standard Kalman lter problem. In terms of the denition of the state vector [w,w e





sYw,( 2 . 7 )
[w = D[w31 + EYw,( 2 . 8 )14
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w is the observed variable and Os and Ps picks out the required elements of [w31
and Yw. At this stage we simply conjecture that private agents know the transition equation
is of the form (2.8) with Yw =(%wt %ws xw yw yw| )0.C o n rmation of this conjecture is
postponed until Section 3, where we use a method of undetermined coe!cients argument to
show that the equilibrium transition equation is indeed of this form.4 Applying the Kalman











s[w31),( 2 . 9 )






















with PY the variance-covariance matrix of Yw.
2.4 The inference problem of the central bank







w%wt. It also has noisy indicators of in ation and output and is aware
that private agents use equation (2.9) to make inferences about the in ation target. The
inference problem it faces is hence whether observed in ation and output  uctuations are due
to changes in the natural rate of interest, changes in inferences made by private agents, or
measurement errors. This is again a standard problem that can be solved by applying the
Kalman lter to an appropriately dened state space form. From the perspective of the central





fYw,( 2 . 1 0 )
[w = D[w31 + EYw,( 2 . 1 1 )
4Strictly speaking, we do not need to conjecture a transition equation to solve the inference problem of
private agents. The only transition dynamics of interest to private agents are the exogenous evolution of the
in ation target, so we could work with a simpler model. We prefer the more general specication to economise
on notation later in the paper.15
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where ]f
w =(w + yw |w + yw| W
w )0 is a vector of observed variables. The matrices Of and
Pf select the appropriate elements to map [w31 and Yw into the observed variables. Since
the central bank and private agents are both assumed to know the structure and parameters
of the model, we use the same conjectured form for the transition equation as we did in the
inference problem of private agents.5 The central bank applies the Kalman lter to the state
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A key feature of the model is that the central bank internalises the inference process of
private agents when making its own inferences. We cannot see this explicitly in our exposition,
but in equilibrium one row of the transition equation (2.11) is precisely the inference process
of private agents (2.9). In this way the matrix D in the transition equation is a function of s
and Os and the inference process of private agents is internalised.
3 Equilibrium dynamics
The equilibrium dynamics of the model are determined by the structural equations, the ex-
ogenous processes, and the processes by which private agents and the central bank infer the
state of the economy. In the previous section we conjectured that equilibrium dynamics could
be described by a transition equation of the form:
[w = D[w31 + EYw.( 3 . 1 )
5In other words, private agents and the central bank share common knowledge about the equilibrium laws
of motion of the economy and the distribution of shocks. What they do not have common knowledge about is
the precise values of some endogenous variables at a particular point in time. Conrmation of the validity of
the conjectured transition equation (2.11) is again postponed until Section 3.16
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We now verify that equilibrium dynamics do have this form and that we can apply the method
of undetermined coe!cients to identify the matrices D and E.
3.1 Structural equations
The structural equations (2.1) and (2.2) can be expressed in terms of the state vector [w
by using the perceived short-term nominal interest rate (2.4) and the policy rule (2.5) to










C 1  0 0 000 0 0000




where L1_2 is an indicator matrix that selects the rst two elements of H
s
w[w+1.F r o m t h e
denition of the state vector [w we know that H
s
w[w  [w and we can write H
s
w[w = Cs[w





w[w, so the left hand side of (3.2) is equivalent to D1_2Cs[w with D1_2
dened as the rst two rows of D. When written in this way, equation (3.2) has the same
form as that conjectured in the transition equation (3.1) and it is valid to apply the method
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D,
which denes the rst two rows of the D matrix. The absence of any coe!cients on Yw in (3.2)
implies that all the elements in the rst two rows of E are zero.
3.2 Exogenous processes
The exogenous processes (2.3) and (2.6) for uq
w and W
w and the denition of %wt can be written
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where the indicator matrix L3_5 selects the third, fourth and fth elements of [w. Equilibrium
























so the exogenous processes dene the third, fourth and fth rows of D and E respectively.
3.3 Inference processes
The inference processes of private agents (2.9) and the central bank (2.12) state that equilib-























where the observables are dened by ]
s
w = Os[w31+PsYw and ]f
w = Of[w31+PfYw.F r o mt h e
denition of the state vector [w we have that Hf
w[w  [w so we can write Hf
w[w = Cf[w and
Hf
w31[w31 = Cf[w31 for an appropriately-dened matrix Cf. Substituting these denitions,
H
s
w[w = Cs[w and H
s
w31[w31 = Cs[w31 into the inference processes implies:
[w =( C
s)









sYw,( 3 . 3 )
[w =( C
f)









fYw,( 3 . 4 )
which veries the conjectured transition equation and validates the use of the method of
undetermined coe!cients. The sixth and seventh rows of (3.3) describe the inferences made
by private agents and dene D6_7 and zeros for E6_7 when coe!cients are compared. The18
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eight to twelfth rows of (3.4) describe the inferences made by the central bank and allow
us to identify D8_12 and E8_12. The other rows in equations (3.3) and (3.4) contain no new
information as they simply replicate restrictions that have already imposed on D and E by
the structural relationships and exogenous processes.
Our analysis demonstrates that the transition equation postulated in (2.8), (2.11) and (3.1)
is consistent with equilibrium dynamics and that the matrices D and E are just identied by
the method of undetermined coe!cients. Equilibrium dynamics are characterised by a xed
point mapping in which the matrices D and E are a function of the Kalman gain parameters ns
and nf, which themselves are a function of the matrices D and E and so on. The quantitative
analysis of the next section is based on an iterative algorithm that solves for this xed point.
4 Quantitative analysis
4.1 Calibration
The baseline calibration of our model is presented in Table 1, where the rst three parameters
follow Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000). The remaining parameters are calibrated so that the
inferences of both private agents and the central bank play a role in equilibrium. For example,
our calibration implies that private agents assign a weight of 0.36 to prediction errors, a value
somehwat higher than that estimated using US data by Erceg and Levin (2003). The key to
making inference non-trivial in equilibrium is suitable calibration of the model’s exogenous
processes. We experimented with many alternatives, but only found inference mattering when
t h ep r o c e s sf o rt h ei n  ation target was calibrated as more persistent than the process for the
natural rate of interest. In our baseline calibration we therefore make the in ation target
highly persistent and the natural rate of interest close to llg.
Parameters n 31 !   %s %t  x  |
Value 0=310 =99 1=50 =95 0=05 0=10 =35 0=20 =10 =1
Table 1: Calibration19
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The standard deviations of innovations of the exogenous processes also matter for inference
in equilibrium. Innovations to the persistent component of the in ation target are calibrated to
a low value so that both persistent and transitory components are important for the dynamics
of the overall in ation target. The results are less sensitive to the precise calibration of the
standard deviations of other innovations, with our baseline calibration taking a broadly neutral
stand as to the relative contribution of each innovation to equilibrium dynamics.
4.2 Results
The asymmetric and incomplete information in our model causes misperceptions in expecta-
tions that impact upon aggregate dynamics. Misperceptions in the expectations of private
agents aect output and in ation through the IS and aggregate supply equations, whereas
misperceptions in central bank expectations have an eect through the short-term nominal
interest rate. A further complication is that misperceptions arise and persist endogenously
in our model as a result of the interrelated inference processes of private agents and the cen-
tral bank. To explain these mechanisms in the calibrated model we examine the impact of
each exogenous shock in turn. We then quantify the amount of volatility they cause in the
aggregate economy.
4.2.1 Shocks to private perceptions
An e g a t i v es h o c k%wt to private perceptions causes the nominal short-term interest rate per-
ceived by private agents to be lower than expected. Private agents react to this news by
attributing the lower nominal interest rate to either a negative misperceptions shock %wt or a
positive shock to the in ation target %ws.O p t i m a lltering requires private agents to put at
least some weight on both these possibilities and partially revise up their estimate of the cen-
tral bank in ation target W
w. In this way the perceptions shock causes private agents to make
an error in their inference. The error leads to a revision of private expectations of in ation
and output in the next period, and consequently equilibrium in ation and output are higher
than what the central bank expected in the next period.
From the perspective of the central bank, the news that in ation and output are higher20
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than expected can be rationalised in three dierent ways. Firstly, it could be due to pure
measurement errors yw and yw| in in ation and output, in which case there is no eect on
private beliefs and there is no need for the central bank to revise its beliefs. Secondly, it could
be due to a negative perceptions shock %wt, which the central bank knows causes private agents
to partially revise up their estimate of the in ation target. In this case the central bank needs




w. Thirdly, it could be due to a positive natural rate of interest
shock xw, which requires the central bank to update its beliefs Hf
wuq
w . That there are three
dierent ways of rationalising news causes problems for central bank inference. The central
bank inevitably makes errors, even when ltering optimally as prescribed by the Kalman lter.
In the case of a perceptions shock examined here, the central bank mistakenly attributes at










































Figure 1: Response to a perceptions shock %wt
Figure 1 shows how the error made by private agents translates into an error made by
the central bank in the baseline calibration of our model. The rst panel shows how private
agents mistakenly revise up their belief about the in ation target after a one standard deviation
negative perceptions shock. This leads in the second panel to a rise in in ation and a rise in
output, which in the third panel the central bank incorrectly attributes to a positive shock to
the natural rate of interest.
The error made by the central bank is a direct consequence of the error made by private
agents. It is only because private agents mistakenly revise up their expectation of the in ation
target that the central bank mistakenly infers a change in the natural rate of interest. This is
the central mechanism in our paper; asymmetric and incomplete information creates a vicious21
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circle in which the di!culty private agents have in inferring the in ation target makes it harder
for the central bank to infer the natural rate of interest.
4.2.2 Shocks to the natural rate of interest
The natural rate of interest is observed directly by private agents but can only be inferred by
the central bank on the basis of its observations of output and in ation. The initial response
to a positive xw shock is therefore an increase in in ation and output as consumers and rms
react to the increase in aggregate demand implied by a higher natural rate of interest. As was
the case for the shock to private perceptions, there are three dierent ways in which the central
bank can rationalise rising in ation and output. Optimal inference is once more destined to
make errors, in this case the central bank mistakenly attributes at least part of the rise in
in ation and output to measurement errors and a negative perceptions shock when in reality it
is all due to a positive natural rate of interest shock. The errors made by the central bank are
unavoidable when information is asymmetric and incomplete as in our model. What is needed
is a transparent monetary policy regime in which the beliefs of private agents are anchored to
the in ation target. Such a regime would improve policy as the central bank would no longer




































Figure 2: Response to a natural rate of interest shock xw
Figure 2 traces out the eects of a positive natural rate of interest shock in the baseline
calibration of the model. The rst panel shows how the shock is initially not fully picked
up by the central bank. The behaviour of consumers and r m s-w h od oo b s e r v et h es h o c k22
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- leads to an increase in in ation and output in the second panel, which the central bank
partially attributes to a perceptions shock in the third panel. Returning to the second panel,
it is apparent that the shock to the natural rate of interest has an eect on in ation. This is
entirely driven by the interrelated inference problems of private agents and the central bank.
If the central bank could observe the natural rate of interest directly then monetary policy
could stabilise the economy and there would be no impact on in ation and output.
4.2.3 Shocks to the in ation target
A positive shock to the in ation target %ws has the same initial eect as a negative perceptions
shock %wt in that the short-term nominal interest rate observed by private agents is lower than
expected. Private agents react to this news as before by partially revising up their estimates
of the central bank’s in ation target, which ceteris paribus w o u l dl e a dt oh i g h e ri n  ation and
o u t p u t .H o w e v e r ,i nc o n t r a s tt ot h ep r e v i o u st w oc a s e st h ec e n t r a lb a n kn o wk n o w st h a tt h e
increase in in ation and output is caused by a change in its in ation target. This knowledge
enables the central bank to adjust policy in real time to ensure that in ation and output are
immediately stabilised. As a consequence, the (unreported) impulse response functions for
in ation and output are completely  at.
The  at impulse responses misleadingly suggest that in ation target shocks have no role
to play in in ation and output dynamics. In practice they do once we consider how in ation
target shocks interact with other shocks in the economy. For example, if past realisations of








then the central bank underestimates the eect of in ation target shocks on the beliefs of
private agents. The unwanted volatility that results does not show up in simple orthogonalised
impulse response analysis. To gain further insight we therefore need either generalised impulse
response functions or more sophisticated summary statistics. In what follows we take the latter
route and present equilibrium dynamics under dierent shock assumptions.23
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1092
September 2009
4.2.4 Volatility
The volatility of all variables in the model can be calculated directly from the transition
equation (3.1). Table 1 shows the resulting unconditional standard deviations as a function
of the standard deviation of shocks to private perceptions. We equate smaller values of the
latter to a more transparent monetary policy regime in which the central bank is better able
to communicate its in ation target. The analogy is appropriate since in both cases the private
sector nds it easier to infer the in ation target and the central bank nds it easier to infer
the natural rate of interest. Under this interpretation, the transparency of policy improves as
we move down Table 1 and comparison of successive rows reveals the incentives for central








w |w w  W
w w
0=300 0=087 0=169 0=180 0=098 0=071
0=250 0=083 0=162 0=152 0=091 0=067
0=200 0=080 0=152 0=127 0=085 0=066
0=150 0=074 0=140 0=109 0=078 0=068
0=100 0=065 0=124 0=097 0=069 0=073
0=000 0=000 0=081 0=089 0=030 0=090
Table 1: Unconditional standard deviations
As expected from the impulse response analysis above, Table 1 shows that an increase in
transparency makes it easier for private agents to infer the in ation target of the central bank.





shows that the beliefs of private agents become more closely anchored to the in ation target
as transparency improves. The central tenet of our paper is that the ability of the central bank
to infer the natural rate of interest is intrinsically linked to this anchoring of beliefs. Such




in tandem with beliefs becoming more closely anchored to the in ation target. We therefore
have our result that the central bank nds it easier to track the natural rate of interest when24
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the beliefs of private agents are more closely anchored to the in ation target. A transparent
monetary policy regime can then promote a virtuous circle in which both private agents and
the central bank nd it easier to perform their respective inferences.6
In terms of aggregate outcomes, columns four and ve of Table 1 demonstrate that trans-
parency reduces the volatility of output and brings in ation closer to its target W
w.W ed on o t
have an explicit welfare metric in our model, but the incentives for transparency are strong in
the sense that it unambiguously reduces any convex combination of the standard deviations
of output and w  W
w.T h e nal column of Table 1 shows that transparency has a non-
monotonic impact on the volatility of in ation. The non-monotonicity arises because there
are two channels through which transparency aects in ation volatility in the model. Firstly,
transparency decreases volatility because it is easier for the central bank to ne-tune stabil-
isation policy when it is better informed about the natural rate of interest in the economy.
This is the central mechanism that we have already stressed. Secondly, transparency increases
volatility as it becomes possible for the central bank to ensure that in ation closely follows
the time-varying in ation target. At low levels of transparency the rst channel dominates
and the volatility in in ation represents undesirable deviations of in ation from its target. At
high levels of transparency the second channel dominates and the resulting volatility re ects
desirable correlation between in ation and its target. It is therefore likely that transparency
is good for welfare even though its eects on in ation volatility are ambiguous. The nding
that transparency unambiguously reduces output volatility vindicates our original desire to
relax the assumption in Aoki and Kimura (2008) that output follows an exogenous process.
Furthermore, the ambiguity with which transparency aects in ation volatility in our results
suggests that the strongest evidence of improved transparency would be an moderation in
output rather than in ation volatility.
6Note that the central bank makes errors in its inference even under full transparency due to the presence
of measurement errors.25
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5 Conclusions
That in ation and output volatility exhibit time-variation has been convincingly argued by
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Cogley and Sargent (2005) and many others over the
last decade. The mechanism we identify in this paper contributes to this debate by showing
how small changes in the transparency of monetary policy can have important implications
for aggregate volatility. Our reasoning is that improvements to transparency create a virtuous
circle in which private agents nd it easier to infer the objectives of the central bank and the
central bank is better placed to identify the shocks hitting the economy. If the central bank
can improve its knowledge in this way then it is in a better position to ne-tune policy and
stabilise the economy. At the heart of our contribution is an assumption that information is
asymmetric and incomplete; we assume that the central bank has better information about
its own objectives than the private agents and that private agents have better information
about the natural rate of interest than the central bank. Neither of these assumptions seems
unreasonable. With such an information structure such as this in place the inference prob-
lems of the central bank and private agents become interrelated and the eects of changes in
transparency are magnied. We therefore identify a new channel through which transparency
promotes macroeconomic stability of both output and in ation in a DSGE model.
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